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There has been a growing literature in both the US (for example Haurin and Brasington 1996, and 
Black 1999) and the UK (for example Gibbons & Machin, 2003) that estimates the way in which 
school quality is capitalised into house prices. Cheshire and Sheppard 1995 and 1999 estimated 
hedonic models in which the quality of the secondary school to which a household was assigned was a 
significant variable which provided evidence that secondary school quality was being capitalised into 
the price of houses. 
 
In contrast Gibbons and Machin concluded that primary schools were more significant. Each of these 
analyses is predicated on the assumption that the value of local schools should be reflected in the value of 
houses.  We argue here that this is rather too simple. We should expect variation in the capitalised price of 
a given school quality at either primary or secondary level according to the elasticity of supply of ‘school 
quality’ in the local market, the certainty with which that quality can be expected to be maintained over 
time and the suitability of the dwelling to accommodate children. These factors will vary systematically 
between and perhaps within cities. This paper explores the sources and the impact of such variations as 
well as the impact of model specification. The results provide new evidence on the complex and subtle 
ways in which housing markets capitalise the value of local public goods such as school quality and 
perhaps most importantly suggest that this is highly non-linear:  houses in the catchment areas of only the 
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  21. Introduction
1 
 
Concern over the quality of local schools, and over the variation in this quality, has drawn the 
attention of parents, policy makers and scholars. For many households, there is a single path to 
access quality education: identify an acceptable quality state-supported school and purchase a 
house in the area served by that school. Households lacking the means to move to such areas will 
face reduced educational opportunities, and that fact continues to generate concern. 
 
Interest in these issues has a long history. For economists, it goes back at least to Tiebout (1956) 
and Oates (1969). The questions they addressed were how do we determine the demand for and 
supply of local public goods, including education, and how do we pay for such goods. It was Oates 
who first drew attention to the ways in which the value of local public goods were capitalised in 
urban land markets. From this many implications flow including the role that land markets play in 
articulating social segregation (see for example, Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou, (1999)) and the 
interaction this will have with the distribution of incomes (see for example Cheshire, Monastiriotis 
and Sheppard, (2000)) and the supply characteristics of local public goods and amenities. In this 
paper we explore the extent of capitalisation of educational quality into house prices, and examine 
how this might be affected by factors conditioning the supply of educational quality of a given 
expected standard as well as by local policies, such as land use planning. 
 
At least four methodological approaches can be distinguished in the literature concerned with 
estimating the value placed on school quality. The longest established is a straightforward hedonic 
approach of which the two of the others are variants. The hedonic approach has some 80 years of 
evolutionary development behind it since agricultural economists first implemented it as a purely 
empirical technique to help identify the characteristics of vegetables commanding the highest 
price. Since Rosen’s (1974) contribution it has become one of the standard techniques for 
analysing the price of complex goods, particularly that of housing.   
 
Over the past 25 years a great many new insights have been gained as to the importance of model 
specification and the way in which the values of local neighbourhood characteristics, local public 
goods and locationally specific amenities are capitalised into land values. In parallel there have 
been important technical innovations in the effort to capture these effects more precisely. Perhaps 
the single most important lesson that has been learned is the most obvious: the value of any house 
varies systematically and substantially with its location and these location-specific factors are at 
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1 We would like to thank the Leverhulme Foundation and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy for supporting the work 
underlying this paper. We would also like to thank numerous colleagues, the referees and the Editor of this journal for 
valuable comments and insights. The usual disclaimer applies with respect to remaining errors. least as important as the characteristics of the structure itself in determining market price. 
Sheppard (1999) provides a survey of recent developments in the hedonic modelling of housing 
markets. 
 
Because there is no a priori basis on which to select the appropriate set of house and locational 
attributes to include and the relationship between market price and characteristics is typically non-
linear, the specification of hedonic models is critical in determining the prices estimated for 
individual characteristics. Poorly specified models can yield misleading results. For example, the 
values of omitted locationally specific characteristics tend to be attributed to the estimated price of 
space, either internal space in the house or land area. Most of the value in the market price of 
urban land is in fact represented by the capitalised value of such locationally specific goods. These 
include the quality of local schools. 
 
This may underlie the concerns that have led researchers recently to search for other ways of 
isolating the values attached to particular local public goods (or other spatially determined 
amenities). One alternative has been the ‘natural experiment’ (see Bogart and Cromwell, 2000) but 
because by their nature natural experiments are limited and not designed to answer specific 
questions, their use has to be opportunistic. In the case of Bogart and Cromwell although they can 
demonstrate that re-drawing school districts or catchment areas does indeed significantly affect 
local house prices (the loss of a neighbourhood school is estimated to reduce the value of the mean 
house price by some 10%) they cannot estimate the specific value attached to school quality. This 
is apparently because they had minimal variance in quality in the districts subject to revised 
boundaries:  ‘...all the schools…are of high quality…’.  
 
The other two methods deployed in the recent literature on the value of schools are essentially 
variants of hedonic analysis. Black (1999) sought to isolate the value placed on school quality by 
taking a large sample of house values for which she could reasonably argue that the only 
difference between them was the quality of the schools to which they gave access. In so far as this 
was correct then it followed that one could attribute differences in their value to differences in 
school quality.  
 
This ‘matched pair’ method is really a type of hedonic analysis. It is implicitly admitted that many 
variables or attributes determine the price paid for the complex good, housing, and the researcher 
is simply trying to set up a situation in which the influence of all but one is eliminated. A difficulty 
with the approach is that there are no obvious tests to apply to see to what extent the research 
  4design has succeeded. In so far as there are omitted spatially fixed effects that are correlated with 
the school districts then there would be bias in the estimated value assigned to schools.  
 
Gibbons and Machin (2003) develop another variant on hedonic analysis. They employ a kernel-
based technique to offset for spatial fixed effects and exploit the co-variation in house prices and 
school performance within narrowly defined spatial units to reduce the need for a large set of 
covariates.  They use mean house prices by area and deviations from means
2. There are some 
potential problems with this approach. One relates to the characteristics of supply which, as is 
discussed below, will vary from city to city and under some circumstances, might vary 
systematically by location within cities. Thus the resulting estimates will be, at best, mean values 
for the whole area analysed (in the case of Gibbons and Machin, broad regions of England) and 
may conceal very large variation between individual cities. Indeed it is perfectly possible that in 




A second problem with this approach is really the same as the criticism of Black’s matched pairs 
approach made above. While one may design the technique to control for spatially fixed effects – 
such as neighbourhood characteristics, other local public goods and specific locationally fixed 
amenities – we cannot test for the extent to which one has succeeded. Some of these locationally 
fixed effects are very local (for example views, access to local amenities, local disamenities from 
industrial land use, noise disturbance or the socio-economic characteristics of the neighbourhood). 
Since the catchment areas of primary schools are small, failure to separately account for spatially 
fixed effects will tend to be reflected in the value of the estimated parameter for primary school 
quality. Sorting processes in housing markets concentrate socio-economic groups whose children 
do better in the educational system in precisely the same areas, exacerbating the upward bias to the 
estimated value of primary school quality. 
 
Because we have data for individual houses and because in our judgement a well constructed 
hedonic model can capture finer nuances and be used to investigate a wider range of possible 
influences we use a traditional hedonic approach and attempt to measure a wide range of local 
neighbourhood characteristics, including the socio-economic composition of the neighbourhood 
                                                 
2 Two alternative estimation strategies are applied to a sub sample for Greater London where they have data for 
individual houses. Both give results close to their deviations from means technique including one which is a traditional 
hedonic model.  
  5
3 Of course in extreme situations such flats might be bought simply to acquire an address within the catchment area of 
a particular school. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this does happen to a very limited extent but as the results 
reported below indicate there is a relationship between the suitability of a property to accommodate children and the 
capitalised value of school quality. and other local public goods and localised amenities. We have also included the most fundamental 
of all features of the structure of urban land markets – land consumption and accessibility to jobs. 
This approach allows us to investigate the interaction between the physical characteristics of 
houses and their gardens with the capitalised values of local schools 
 
2. The supply of quality and capitalisation into house values 
 
One starting point for this study is the realisation that the economic and institutional structure 
within which educational opportunities are made available will naturally influence the extent to 
which school quality is capitalised in house prices. While the demand for school quality may not 
vary greatly from one city to another, at least within the same country, the implicit price may vary 
substantially because of variation in the characteristics of its supply which can vary substantially 
from one city to another. Where educational opportunities are at least in part determined by 
residential location, there are three central factors that are relevant in determining the supply of 
quality and the extent of capitalisation. These are the elasticity and nature of housing supply, the 
availability of substitute providers of education (other than the state-supported provider designated 
for the particular address), and the anticipated risk of variation in the quality of education 
provided. We discuss each of these factors in turn. 
 
A. Housing Supply 
 
An important source of variation in educational opportunity is the availability of housing suitable 
for accommodating children in the areas served by (better) quality schools. The responsiveness in 
housing supply, in turn, is determined by construction costs and local planning regulations (see, 
for example, Barker, 2003). Cross sectional variance in the elasticity of housing supply is largely 
determined by variation in planning regulations. If in one location the supply of houses is fixed 
whilst it is highly elastic in another, then the measured capitalisation of school quality will vary 
even though demand is invariant.  
 
Variation in land use planning (or zoning) policies implies that we may observe substantial 
differences in the supply characteristics of school quality between cities. Furthermore, there may 
be differences in the supply of school quality within cities.  This may arise because of differing 
elasticities of supply of housing according to location.  Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) identified 
substantial differences in the degree of planning restriction on housing supply between cities that 
corresponded with differences in the capitalised price of secondary schools.  The market from 
which the data for the present study are drawn, Reading in southern England, is subject to 
restrictive policies of urban containment, so there will be a relatively inelastic supply of housing in 
  6the whole area but localised housing supply will vary from location to location within it, as 
particular parcels of land are released. 
 
Local variation in housing supply elasticity, and its impact on capitalisation has been the focus of 
recent research in US housing markets.  Hilber and Mayer (2002) and Brasington (2002) have 
drawn attention to the fact that the extent of capitalisation may be reduced in areas where housing 
supply would be expected to be more elastic. Comparing across cities in Massachusetts, Hilber and 
Mayer find empirical support for the observation. Comparing central with peripheral residential 
properties in urban areas of Ohio, Brasington finds that the capitalised value of a given level of 
quality is reduced for houses at the edge of the urban area.  
 
It is possible that observed reductions in capitalisation might exist for other reasons, related to the 
availability of substitute sources of education, variation in the physical characteristics of the 
housing stock, making it more or less suitable for accommodating children or the degree of 
uncertainty attached to current measures of school quality discussed below. Before proceeding to 
consider these factors, we note a final explanation related to the regulation of housing supply. An 
apparent discount in the implicit price of school quality could be due to a land use planning system 
that concentrates new construction in localities with significant local disamenities (and hence 
reduced opposition to new development), where the disamenities are difficult to measure and so 
control for. In this case apparent discounting of school quality might reflect the impact of such 
omitted variables. 
 
B. State School Quality and the Availability of Substitutes 
 
Even if the supply of housing were completely inelastic, house values would be little affected by 
school quality if substitute sources of quality education were readily available. In such cases, the 
only impact of state-supported school quality on house values would be an accessibility premium 
related to proximity to the school.  This distance related premium might be expected to be higher 
for primary schools since children younger than 10 or 11 are more likely to be taken to school by a 
parent, increasing the cost of distance.  
 
In Reading, there are four possible substitutes for the dedicated state school (and these may vary 
between the primary and secondary levels). These are (1) a private school, (2) a church (parochial) 
school, (3) admission to a state-supported ‘Grammar School’ and (4) obtaining a transfer to a 
state-supported school other than the one designated as serving the address. 
 
  7Reading is a relatively high-income community, well endowed with private schools, particularly at 
secondary level. This suggests there will be an upper limit on the capitalised price of school quality. 
Access to private schooling is controlled largely by income not location, so if a given degree of 
school quality can always be purchased in the private market for educational services, this price will 
determine the upper limit of the capitalised value of state school quality, but the cost of private 
schools implies that this upper limit will be relatively high. 
 
At the primary school level (i.e. for children below the age of 11) there are a variety of state-funded 
church schools, admission to which is more loosely related to home address.  While in some 
neighbourhoods this might be a factor, there are indirect costs associated with church schools. For 
example, Gibbons and Machin (2003) point out that such education entails a cost associated with 
conforming to religious requirements. This suggests that church schools may be similar to the 
availability of private education in its overall impact: it places an upper limit on the estimated value of 
educational quality, but this limit will tend to be relatively high. 
 
The impact of the continued existence of Grammar Schools in Reading (state-supported secondary 
schools with entry highly selective according to tested academic ability) on the capitalisation of 
school quality can probably be safely ignored. Entry is so selective and possible for such a small 
proportion of the cohort that the risk associated with assuming one’s child will gain admission 
must be very great.  
 
A considerably more plausible influence on the extent of capitalisation of school quality is the 
possibility that a household requests and is granted permission to send their children to a state-
supported school other than the one to which the house would usually be allocated. At the limit, if 
parents could freely choose any school, then, except for the distance costs, the supply of school 
quality for every home would be perfectly elastic. The frequency with which appeals against 
school assignment are successful determines the overall ‘porosity’ of school catchment zones.  
 
In England (as in many other countries) each house is assigned to a default primary and secondary 
school. Parents may in principle nominate any school for their child but presumably there is 
considerable inertia: most parents simply accept the local school. In requesting a different school 
to the local one, parents are presumably influenced by their perception of the probability of such a 
nomination being successful. If they choose a school other than their default school and the local 
education authority (LEA) does not accept this choice then parents may appeal. Again it is likely 
that in deciding whether to appeal parents take some account of the probability of success since the 
appeal process takes some time and effort.  
  8In trying to compare differences in the underlying ‘porosity’ – the probability that a child living at 
a particular address will actually attend the local default school in the catchment area of which the 
house is located – we are hampered by only being able to observe some of the relevant variables.  
There are no data on the proportion of parents choosing a non-local school or on the proportion of 
such choices that are rejected by the LEA. Since 1997, however, there are systematic data on the 
appeals process. Figures are published for all LEAs in England on the total number of admissions 
to primary and secondary schools, on the number of appeals against the allocations made by 
parents and the outcome of these appeals. Data are available for all LEAs but we have just selected 
a number for comparison in Table 1. The choice of England as a whole, London and the combined 
LEAs which serve the Reading housing market area is self-explanatory. Oxfordshire is the LEA 
adjoining Reading to the north; the housing market areas of Nottingham and Darlington have been 
studied by the present authors elsewhere (see Cheshire, Marlee and Sheppard, 1999) although the 
focus in that study was on the impact of land supply on house prices. Manchester is a 
representative large city in the north of England and Cheshire is typical of a number of northern 
LEAs which have a high success rate for appeals – over 60 % at the secondary school level. 
Together these LEAs represent a wide range of the observed pattern. 
 
Table 1: Success rate of Appeals against School Allocation  
Relative to Admissions (1) and per Appeal (2) 
Authority Primary  Schools  Secondary  Schools 
  1997-98 1998-99 1999-00  Mean  1997-98 1998-99 1999-00  Mean 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
England  1.7 31.0 1.6 29.0 1.3 25.4 1.5 28.5 1.8 23.3 2.0 23.5 2.3 23.5 2.0 23.4
Reading Area
3 1.6 31.4 3.7 31.2 1.7 17.3 2.3 26.6 0.4  7.5  0.6 15.6 0.5  9.6  0.5 10.9
Inner  London  1.5 16.0 1.2 15.1 0.6  8.9  1.1 13.3 1.8 15.0 1.7  9.3  1.6  8.3  2.1 10.9
Greater 
London 
2.7 23.6 2.1 20.3 1.3 15.7 2.0 19.9 2.2 13.9 2.2 11.9 2.7 13.3 2.4 13.0
Oxfordshire  1.3 43.0 1.6 47.6 1.2 42.4 1.4 44.3 1.5 38.4 2.1 45.4 1.5 33.3 1.7 39.0
Darlington  7.1 44.9 8.8 40.7 6.0 41.5 7.3 42.4 4.1 34.3 4.7 37.1 2.5 31.6 3.8 34.3
Nottingham  0.4 30.3 0.8 28.4 1.4 35.2 0.9 31.3 0.5 21.7 0.8 17.6 1.0 23.7 0.8 21.0
Manchester  2.2 28.0 2.8 38.7 1.7 25.7 2.2 30.8 1.2 14.7 2.1 24.1 2.1 18.2 1.8 19.0
Cheshire  0.1 27.5 0.7 69.2 0.7 51.3 0.5 49.3 0.5 62.7 2.0 59.3 3.9 65.0 2.1 62.3
1Successful Appeals as % of Total Admissions 
2Successful Appeals as % of Total Appeals   
3Weighted 
mean for three Local Education Authorities: weights determined by distribution of sampled houses 
 
Patterns are reasonably consistent between LEAs. Darlington has a high rate of successful appeals, 
and Cheshire has a low rate relative to admissions but a high proportion of the appeals that there 
are, are successful (perhaps indicating a very flexible policy with a high rate of unobserved 
nominations of non-local schools as well). Inner London has a low rate of both successful appeals 
relative to admissions and relative to appeals. This may reasonably be interpreted as indicating an 
inflexible regime in which the school a child attends is largely determined by home address.  
 
  9The data for Reading suggest a regime that is rather less restrictive than that of Inner London at the 
primary level but even more restrictive at the secondary level. Looking at the mean rates for the 
three years only 0.5 % of children successfully appealed against their secondary school allocation 
in the Reading area (one quarter the success rate of Inner London or England as a whole) and 10 % 
of appeals were successful – the same as Inner London but half the proportion of England and one 
sixth that of Cheshire.  
 
C. Risk of Variation in School Quality 
 
The relevant measure of school quality should be expected school quality. The quality of a school 
can change over time so current school quality as an indicator of expected school quality is subject 
to a degree of risk. There are various possible sources of future change but one is boundary 
redefinition. Since LEAs are responsible for defining school catchment areas they can revise them 
on a regular basis in order to fill available school places and eliminate spare capacity.  Officials 
from the LEAs responsible for the Reading area have confirmed that this is standard practice there. 
This creates uncertainty for the buyer concerning which school will serve the house in the future, 
especially in those parts of the urban area where the number of children of school age is less 
stable. Since the limited land release for development that does occur in Reading takes place 
mostly at the urban periphery, for properties located near the edge of the built up area there is an 
added source of uncertainty. Not only is it less certain to which school their home will be assigned 
by the LEA but the nature of the population who will be served by the school is also more likely to 
change.  The combined impact of these considerations is to impose greater risk of variation in 
school quality in some areas (primarily the periphery and, particularly in areas of new 
construction) of the market than in others. 
 
The evidence reviewed above supports the conclusion that in the area from which our sample is 
drawn, Reading, most children go to the school determined by the location of their home and by 
the boundaries of the catchment areas in force in the year they first go to either primary (at 5 years) 
or secondary school (at 11). This probability is significantly higher at the secondary school level 
and is very high by the standards of England as a whole.  
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Let us summarise our observations concerning the elasticity of supply of school quality (or at least 
supply as measured by those variables we are using to capture it). If parents are concerned to 
increase the probability of their child(ren) attaining a particular level of qualification then their 
choice at the primary level will be between: a secular state primary, a church school or a private 
school. If they choose a state school then they can move to the catchment area of the school of 
their choice, trading off price against quality; or they can try to obtain entry to a more distant – probably a church – school and pay a price in the journey to school and church. De facto there is 
more flexibility (that is an ability to exercise choice of school) at primary than at secondary school 
level. These considerations suggest the supply of school quality at primary level may be more 
elastic than it is at the secondary school level. 
 
At the secondary level parents can make similar choices except that in Reading there is a strong 
constraint against choosing any secondary school other than the one in the catchment area of 
which they live. Boundaries of catchment areas are revised annually, adding some uncertainty to 
the correspondence between school and residential address and this uncertainty is likely to be 
systematically higher in lower density areas on the periphery and in those areas where new 
construction is concentrated, as LEAs attempt to manipulate intakes to utilise school capacity. 
 
3. Data and Setting 
 
Reading, England, the urban area from which our data are drawn is located on the Thames about 
35 miles west of central London. Reading is subject to considerable pressure for growth and 
residential development, and has adopted some of the most restrictive planning policies in England 
and Wales. With frequent high-speed rail links to London, proximity to Heathrow airport and other 
locational advantages the area has attracted a number of high technology firms
4 and more 
generally follows the development patterns typical of prosperous, middle-size cities of the 
southeast of England. Despite its proximity to London, Reading is a major employment centre 
with more than 85% of its employed residents working locally and a strong central business 
district employment concentration. It is a reasonable city, therefore, to which to apply the familiar 
monocentric model of urban land use as developed by Alonso (1964) or Mills (1967). 
 
In 1991 the city had a population of approximately 337,000 persons in its wider urban region 
comprising 129,000 households. For the 1999/2000 period the present data relate to we estimate 
that there were 131,370 households in the urban area as defined from 1991 Census wards. Our 
initial sample of properties comprised over 870 separate structures. This provided a sample of 
approximately 20% of the residential properties offered for sale by major estate agents during the 
sampled 17 months.  Complete data including location, structure characteristics, sales date and 
price, and school assignments were available for 490 observations and these are used in the 
analysis below. 
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4 Microsoft, Oracle, Hewlett-Packard and others Supplemental information on land use was assembled from Ordnance Survey resources and aerial 
photographs. Data on both secondary and primary school catchment areas were obtained from the 
local education authorities. Data on the quality of state (in US English – public) schools were 
obtained from the Department of Education website
5. The measure used for primary schools was 
the performance of its pupils on the Key Stage 2 tests
6 for the most recent year prior to the date of 
sale. For secondary schools the measure of school quality was the proportion of pupils obtaining 5 
or more passes at grade C or better in GCSE,
7 again for the most recent year. Data on the 
availability, performance and price of local private schools were obtained from the ISIS website. 
The Department of Local Government, Transport and the Regions’ (DETR) index of employment 
deprivation was used as the measure of the socio-economic characteristics of the neighbourhood. 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample and a description of each variable used 
in the analysis. 
                                                 
5 http://www.dfes.gov.uk/statistics/DB/SBU/b0333/index.html 
6 Tests administered nationwide and designed to assess achievement in mastering that portion of the national 
curriculum, known as ‘Key Stage 2’, deemed appropriate for ages 7 to 11. 
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7 A nationwide exam taken at minimum school leaving age, 16. Table 2: Variable Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  σ Min Max Description
Price 126.9378  48.6852 45 385 Price in thousands of pounds
Detached 0.0984  0.2981 0 1 1 if property is a detached house
Semi-detached 0.1687  0.3748 0 1 1 if property is a semi-detached 
house
Terrace 0.3896  0.4881 0 1 1 if property is a terrace house
Townhouse 0.1024  0.3035 0 1 1 if property is a townhouse
Parking 0.3153  0.4651 0 11 if property has off-street parking
Thames 0.0080  0.0894 0 1 1 if centre of plot is within 150 m 
of Thames
Rail 0.1104  0.3138 0 1 1 if centre of plot is within 200 m 
of rail line
Cul-de-sac 0.2209  0.4153 0 1 1 if property is located on a cul-
de-sac
Minor Road  0.6386  0.4809 0 1 1 if property is located on minor 
through street
B-Road 0.0161  0.1258 0 1 1 if located on “B” class roadway
A-Road 0.0482  0.2144 0 1 1 if located on “A” class roadway 
Time Trend  0.9351  0.3020 0 1.4740 Years since 6/1999 (time trend)
Bedrooms 2.5815  0.8436 0 6 Number of bedrooms
Baths 1.3448  0.6576 0 5 Number of bathrooms
Nosquare 0.6103  0.1814 0.1854 1.0408 Ratio of plot size to perimeter
SqFt 676.115  242.132 189.861 1749.014 Square feet of internal living 
space in house
Ethnic 4.6290  2.3438 0.0470 8.8660 % of Census ward population of 
Afro-Caribbean descent 1991
Industry 10.6827  11.7065 0 50 % of land within 1 km square in 
industrial use
EmployDepriv 7.0933  2.2435 2.4418 10.2846 DETR index of employment 
deprivation
Plotsize 222.6534  214.7078 22.10882054.5471 Plot size in square metres
Distance 2289.1982  1462.9522 54.65398331.3380 Distance from town centre in 
metres
θ -0.4863  2.0548 -3.1391 3.1391 Direction in radians from town 
centre (East=0)
PrimarySchool   1.8654  0.4713 1.14 2.84 Sum of share of pupils in 
assigned school passing Key 
Stage 2 exams in English, Math, 
and Science
SecondarySchool 0.3469  0.1390 0.1 0.75 Share of pupils in assigned 
school receiving a grade of C or 
better in 5 or more GCSE exams
PrimarySchool   1.8457  0.4650 1.14 2.86 Sum of share of pupils in nearest 
school passing Key Stage 2 
exams in English, Math, and 
Science (Models II and IV)
SecondarySchool 0.3633  0.1356 0.05 0.72 Share of pupils in nearest school 
receiving a grade of C or better in 
5 or more GCSE subject exams 
(Models II and IV)
PrimarySchool S.D.  0.3456  0.1373 0.0908 0.6770 Standard Deviation of 
PrimarySchool measured over 
period 1996-2001
SecondarySchool S.D  0.0508  0.0258 0.0137 0.0821 Standard Deviation of 
SecondarySchool measured over 
period 1996-2001
Periphery 0.0944  0.2926 0 1 1 if Property located in peripheral 
ward with new construction
  
  134.  The Hedonic Model 
 
Our basic model follows a procedure similar to that set out in Cheshire and Sheppard (1995, 
1998). We precisely locate each house in the sample and measure the size of the plot of land 
associated with it. We then estimate a modified linear Box-Cox hedonic price function given in 
equation (1). Note that the value function for urban residential land, specified in equation (2), is 
estimated directly as part of the hedonic price function. The land rent is ‘monotonic’ only in the 
sense that it is radially symmetric so that land value must increase or decrease at the same rate in 




























































structure and location-specific characteristics 
 






















set of indices of characteristics which are continuously variable 






land rent function given by: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 4 3 2 n x
1 e x r
β − θ ⋅ ⋅ β + β ⋅ ⋅ β = θ
sin ,  (2) 
where:    
x  =  Distance from the city centre 
θ  =  Angle of deflection from the city centre 
n  =  Number of ‘ridges’ in land value, representing radial asymmetries 
βi  =  Estimated parameters of land value function 
The classic monocentric urban model assumes symmetrical transport systems implying that the 
land value surface will be symmetrical. In actual cities, however, the costs of access to the centre 
will normally vary depending on the direction of travel determined by the orientation of the main 
transport infrastructure. The orientation of this infrastructure – typically the main road access to 
the city centre – should be expected to give rise to asymmetries in the value surface taking the 
form of ‘ridges’ tracking the main road access.  Searching over a small grid (1-4) it was 
  14determined that a rent function with n=3 ridges provided the best fit to the data. The estimated land 
value depends on the location and also the size of the plot and type of structure built upon it. For a 
structure matching the sample mean in all attributes (except location) the spatial structure of the 







































Fig. 1 – Plot of land value per acre  Fig. 2 – Land value with contours 
 
The surface is viewed from the southeast looking towards the northwest. The three ridges closely 
track the local transport system. They are aligned with the main road access routes to the city 
centre: the A329M linking the main London Bristol motorway – the M4 – to the centre from its 
eastern junction; the access route from the M4 at its junction to the south of the city along the A33; 
and the main route, again linking to the M4, to the west of the city along the A4. 
 
The measure of the value of land shown in Figs. 1 and 2 is essentially the price of ‘land as pure 
space with accessibility’. Actual market prices of vacant land include the capitalised value of all 
the local amenities, neighbourhood characteristics and local public goods to which occupation of 
the land gives access. As was shown in Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) these amenity values 
typically exceed the value of land as pure space with accessibility
8.  
 
5.  Interpreting the results 
 
  15
                                                 
8 In the data studied in Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) the amenity values were greater by a factor of up to eight We follow a similar estimation strategy to that set out in Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995. The results 
for six models are presented in Table 3
9. Model I presents estimates of a basic model including 
measures of the quality of the primary and secondary schools to which the address is assigned by 
the local education authority. Model II presents an estimate of the same model, but using the 
quality measures of the primary and secondary school that are nearest (straight-line distance) to the 
house. Model III presents a model using the measures of school quality at the assigned schools, but 
drops the DETR Employment Deprivation index
10, and Model IV repeats this structure using the 
school quality measures from the nearest schools.  In all these cases the value of the quality 
measures for educational quality reported most recently prior to the sale (and so available to the 
purchaser) is applied. 
 
The last two models test for the impact of past variation in the measure of school quality and the 
suitability for children of the dwelling’s physical characteristics on estimated quality 
capitalisation. They also include an index for the house being located in an area of the urban 
periphery that has experienced considerable new construction. In Model V this index is included in 
a way that allows estimation of any discounting of the value of school quality and its variability 
for houses in these areas; in Model VI a simple dummy variable is incorporated if the house is 
located in a (peripheral) area within which new construction has been concentrated. The rationale 
and specification of Models V and VI are discussed in more detail below.  
                                                 
9 One aspect of this strategy is to test carefully for problems of collinearity, particularly in the structural characteristics 
of houses, and drop those where this is a problem and especially where they can be subsumed in other characteristics. 
In these models for example Bathrooms subsume separate WCs and Off-street parking subsumes garages.  
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10 Given the lack of neighbourhood income estimates in Britain several of the available deprivation indices were tried. 
The multiple index of deprivation worked best in a statistical sense but, because one small element of that is the 
performance of the local primary school on Key Stage 2, the results obtained using the employment deprivation index 






























As Model V but 
shift dummy for 
New construction
β0 3.124553  3.236343 3.336312 3.29032 2.98713  2.988932
t 29.601  11.183 31.084 16.088 134.114  130.096
βDetached 0.185303  0.201205 0.238915 0.224075 0.188676  0.187413
t 8.469  4.751 12.608 6.321 8.496  9.559
βSemi-detached 0.119002  0.134669 0.150193 0.14736 0.114038  0.113261
t 6.800  4.798 9.395 6.204 5.124  5.343
βTerrace 0.051215  0.054739 0.066083 0.058462 0.055143  0.054152
t 4.195  3.517 5.544 4.425 4.241  4.058
βTownhouse 0.07224  0.080601 0.084975 0.081427 0.076023  0.075155
t 4.868  4.201 5.853 4.648 3.647  3.630
βParking 0.011386  0.010764 0.01165 0.007322 0.013094  0.013630
t 1.742  1.607 1.762 1.062 0.886  1.555
βThames 0.074639  0.091209 0.09254 0.107257 0.075568  0.075267
t 2.339  2.487 2.991 2.825 1.641  2.804
βRail -0.00837  -0.00985 -0.0076 -0.00957 -0.010269  -0.010543
t -0.949  -1.052 -0.855 -1.002 -0.546  -0.577
βCul-de-sac 0.030018  0.03431 0.05332 0.050991 0.037955  0.035173
t 2.265  2.234 4.197 3.389 2.074  2.204
βMinor Rd. 0.005123  0.006463 0.019676 0.018172 0.015350  0.012631
t 0.452  0.565 1.749 1.559 0.942  0.922
βB-Road 0.099615  0.109639 0.139194 0.133493 0.117888  0.113314
t 3.814  3.203 5.448 4.254 4.586  3.963
βA-Road -0.0013  -0.00385 0.024584 0.011935 -0.000136  -0.004564
t -0.071  -0.227 1.381 0.679 -0.006  -0.200
βTimeTrend 0.029917  0.034401 0.037374 0.041336 0.030664  0.030699
t 3.185  2.931 4.153 3.862 1.596  1.754
βBedrooms 0.02032  0.024127 0.027871 0.025885 0.011317  0.011279
t 3.031  2.955 3.939 3.619 1.097  1.410
βBathrooms 0.051009  0.055213 0.061564 0.062694 0.071603  0.070477
t 6.320  4.717 8.261 6.458 6.009  7.549
βNotsquare 0.04914  0.052667 0.063436 0.053442 0.044112  0.042959
t 2.848  2.469 3.579 2.745 2.081  2.110
βSqFt 0.007772  0.005708 0.005827 0.007122 0.020549  0.020357
t 18.951  6.457 21.543 10.140 12.534  11.171
Βethnic    -0.005855 -0.004724
t   -1.036  -0.799
βIndustrialLand -0.00113  -0.0014 -0.00137 -0.00214 -0.000599  -0.000995
t -1.663  -2.071 -2.083 -2.780 -0.427  -0.691
βEmployDepriv -0.02416  -0.02372 -0.018370  -0.018487
t -5.899  -6.048 -4.419  -4.250
βPrimarySchool  0.000836 0.000971 0.005957 0.002127 0.001524  0.001277
t 2.461  1.384 1.854 1.656 4.163  4.214
βPrimarySchool S.D.    -0.095804 -0.096449
t   -4.142  -4.333
βSecondarySchool  0.588393 0.335556 0.474515 0.513499 0.041381  0.040883
t 6.215  4.766 4.212 3.557 1.787  1.864
βSecondarySchool S.D.    -0.088845  -0.089455
t   -3.868  -4.027
β1 0.00766  0.009199 0.001622 0.001981 0.006635  0.006713
t 1.352  4.447 5.059 1.577 4.179  4.266



























As Model V but 
shift dummy for 
New construction
t -3.148  -3.502 -2.349 -2.610 -3.296  -2.866
β3 0.000516  0.000485 0.001067 0.000606 0.000428  0.000394
t 1.953  2.190 1.724 1.647 1.979  1.651
β4 -3.79069  -3.87525 -3.9581 -4.07902 -3.812222  -3.811957
t -23.445  -21.723 -21.876 -17.254 -99.727  -147.837
λ1 0.500048  0.551618 0.576605 0.531902 0.360893  0.361161
t 24.429  9.681 48.943 13.406 13.135  15.566
λ2 6.445736  6.508272 4.710182 6.026819 6.961245  6.960813
t 11.943  8.204 7.628 8.719 314.276  299.666
ξ 0.417822  0.425036 0.73667 0.737899 0.445310  0.444501
t 2.257  4.063 9.434 5.473 19.381  19.429
Ψ -0.14056  -0.1213 -0.09503 -0.10093 -0.128824  -0.129521
t -7.913  -2.794 -8.552 -3.568 -21.153  -22.378
βPeriphery   -0.398027  -0.011234
t   -7.607  -0.577
σ 0.075256  0.082311 0.095002 0.092192 0.078471  0.078423
 10.913  4.735 18.492 6.946 22.067  23.818
Log Likelihood  -2103.11  -2101.9 -2110.45 -2109.55 -2087.01  -2088.27
N 490  490 490 490 488  488
 
β1,…, β4 are the parameters of the rent function (see equation 2) 
Ψ, ξ, λ1, λ2 are the Box-Cox transformation parameters for respectively house price (the dependent variable), land, 
continuous variables (other than school quality) and school quality 
  18A. Value of Primary and Secondary Schools 
 
Using the basic models in which the results are easier to interpret, we start by addressing the 
question: which types of schools are of greater value to purchasers of houses? There are at least 
two different approaches to this question, and it turns out (at least in the Reading housing market 
in 2000) that each approach gives a somewhat different answer. 
 
The first approach is simply to compare the estimated hedonic prices of each measure of school 
quality. Examination of the parameter estimates in Table 3 shows that the estimated parameter for 
the quality of secondary schools is considerably larger than for primary schools (as well as having 
a larger t value associated with it). A better comparison is afforded if we standardise the ranges of 
the quality measures. Fig. 3 presents plots of the hedonic price (in thousands of pounds
11) for both 
the measure of secondary and primary school quality, standardised so that the movement from 0 to 
1 represents the total possible range of outcomes in the quality measure. At comparable levels, the 
secondary school quality is ‘more valuable’. It is notable how non-linear the price paid for school 
quality appears to be; better quality really only commands a substantial price in the top one third 
of the school quality distribution.  
 
An alternative approach is to ask 
ig. 4 provides one way of examining this issue. The figure shows the predicted value of the 
                                                
which factor contributes the most 
to the value of houses within our 
sample. This question is different 
because of differences in the 
range of measured school 
qualities; as indicated in Table 2, 
the standard deviation of primary 
school quality is more than three 
time that of secondary schools. 
This is reflected in the estimated change in value of an average house as we move from the lowest 








Figure 3:  Comparison of price of quality
F
average (bottom curve) and the most expensive (top curve) house in the sample as secondary 
(solid line) or primary (dashed line) school quality varies from the lowest observed level to the 
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11 Evaluated for a house whose value and other characteristics are equal to sample mean values. maximum possible (the vertical axis is measured in thousands of pounds, while the horizontal axis 
is measured as indicated for secondary and primary school quality).  
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Figure 4: Impact of School Quality on House Prices
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Figs. 5 and 6 provide a visual representation of the joint impact of school quality of both types on 
the price of an ‘average’ house, along with the distribution of observations in the sample within 
different ranges of the school quality spectrum. Fig. 5 provides a surface that illustrates the impact 
on house values of changes in both primary (Key Stage 2) and secondary (GCSE) school quality. 
Fig. 6 superimposes this surface over a ‘histogram’ that shows the share of sample observations 






















































Fig. 5 – Impact of quality on house price  Fig. 6 – Impact and distribution of quality 
 
It is apparent that the distribution of state-sector secondary schools is concentrated in the lower to 
middle quality range, while the distribution of state supported primary schools covers a broader 
range of quality. Whether this is the cause of, or caused by the availability if non-state supported 
secondary schools that through competitive entry specialize in the middle to upper quality range is 
interesting but not central to our analysis. It is the state-supported sector that makes location of 
  20residence an important factor in determining the school available to a household’s children, and it 
is the quality in this sector that will be capitalised into house values. 
 
In summary, while the hedonic price of secondary school quality is higher than the price of 
primary school quality, moving from the worst to the best possible secondary school would 
increase the value of the average house by £23,763 (or 18.7 % of the value of a mean house). 
Moving from the worst to the best possible primary school would increase the value of the average 
house by £42,541 (33.5 % of the mean house value). In passing it may be noted that the value 
added to the price of a mean characteristics house moving it from the catchment area of the worst 
to the best secondary school estimated from a sample drawn for Reading in 1984 was 13.9 % (see 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1995)) and for 1993 was 14.1 % (Cheshire, Monastiriotis and Sheppard 
(2000)). Neither hedonic model used for these earlier periods included primary school quality 
since Key Stage 2 test results were not available then. Leech and Campos (2003) examine the 
impact on house prices in Coventry, and estimate a 20% premium associated with location in a 
desirable secondary school area compared with a less desirable one. A recent study in 
Christchurch New Zealand (McClay and Harrison, 2004) found a premium relative to the sample 
mean price of 48% for the best girls’ school and 28% for the best boys’ school with the premium 
for the best girls’ school about equal to the opportunity cost of private school fees. 
 
B. Models with Measurement Error: Nearest vs. Assigned Schools 
 
Assignment of houses to a default primary and secondary school is up to the LEA. This 
information is not available from any central source, and for some education authorities can be 
difficult to obtain. Partly for this reason some studies of the effects of school quality often do not 
actually use the quality level of the assigned school, but rather the quality level of the school 
(primary or secondary) that is located nearest to the house. While this is feasible, there is a 
question as to whether it provides a good approximation of the school quality that would actually 
be available to the residents of a particular house. For our sample we determined assigned 
catchment area for each observation from either published maps
12 or from an online service 
provided by the LEA that allowed entry of addresses and responded with assigned schools.
13 Fig. 
7, shows the secondary school catchment areas for the Reading housing market in 1999/2000 
determined either directly from the maps or from the pattern of responses provided by the online 
service.  
 
                                                 
12 For the West Berkshire LEA. 
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13 For Reading and Wokingham LEAs. The map shows that many catchment areas are irregular and elongated, implying that the nearest 
school is often not a reliable proxy for the school to which an address is assigned. There are 
examples of non-contiguous catchment areas in the sparsely populated western periphery of the 
area. Finally, there are two examples of school catchment areas that span local authority 
boundaries, an arrangement that makes cooperative use of local buildings and fixed capital but that 
poses problems for econometric specifications assuming that such situations do not arise, and 











Secondary School Catchment Areas
 
The irregularity of areas and assignment of houses to schools other than the nearest school is also 
clear in the primary school catchment areas. A sample of three relatively typical catchment areas is 
shown in Fig. 8, along with the locations of sample properties in each area and surrounding areas 
and the location of the school buildings for each area. Because school buildings are not necessarily 
located near the centre of the catchment area, and the areas themselves are irregular in shape, 
assigning houses to the nearest school will result in significant mis-classification of properties. 
 
Appendix Table 1 presents the correlations (across properties in our sample) between quality 
variables for assigned and for nearest schools. It is immediately apparent that the correlation 
between the quality measures for assigned schools and closest schools is low. In the case of 
secondary schools, which have larger catchment areas, the correlation is only 0.435.   








Selected Primary School Catchment Areas
 
Fig. 8 
Comparing the estimated parameters for models I and II (shown in Table 3) we see that using 
quality measures for schools actually assigned to addresses provides a better fit for the data than 
using the values for the closest school. The t values for the relevant parameters fall and that for 
primary schools ceases to be significantly different from zero. These results suggest that caution is 
certainly appropriate when interpreting estimates based on measurement of school quality using 
the nearest school rather than the assigned school.   
 
C. Quality of Schools and Neighbourhoods: Estimation with Omitted Variables 
 
A further concern in the evaluation of school quality arises because the school catchment area, 
particularly for primary schools, may serve as an approximation for more localised amenities and 
neighbourhood effects. Therefore omitted variables, particularly those related to neighbourhood 
quality, may bias the estimates of the value of educational quality. To evaluate the impact of this 
we examine the effect on model estimation when the DETR employment deprivation index 
variable is dropped. This variable provides a measure of concentration in the neighbourhood 
(census ward) of people having little success in the local labour market. It therefore helps to 
capture the socio-economic character of the neighbourhood. 
 
  23Dropping the measure of the socio-economic character of the neighbourhood substantially 
increases the estimated value of the primary school parameter – it increases sevenfold in absolute 
terms – but because it impairs the overall performance of the model its t value is still lower than in 
Model I. The estimate for the secondary school parameter falls in absolute terms if the deprivation 
index is dropped, although it remains statistically significant. This provides justification for 
concern that there is likely to be an upward bias in the estimated impact of primary school quality 
on house prices if other important local neighbourhood effects are not independently controlled 
for. 
 
D. Discounting School Quality: The Role of Uncertainty, House Characteristics and New Construction 
 
Models V and VI explore some rather more subtle issues. It has been argued in the literature in the 
US that differences in land availability and new construction between communities will generate 
differences in the elasticity of supply of educational quality. Hilber and Mayer (2002) focus on 
inter community differences whereas Brasington (2002) investigates the possible impact of land 
availability and new construction in the centre compared to the suburbs of the same city. Where 
new construction is possible some of the increased demand associated with better schools may be 
accommodated by increases in the local supply of housing leading to lower capitalisation of a 
given level of educational quality. The problem with such an explanation, applied at the within 
city level, is that it would require that the urban housing market would in some sense be in 
disequilibrium: residents would be able to ‘buy’ a given quality of education at a lower price in 
areas of new construction than they could elsewhere.  
 
A second possible reason why there might be a discount in areas of new construction in cities in 
southeast England is that the planning system operates in such a way as to concentrate new 
development in localities with disamenties of some sort. Development in such areas generates less 
opposition from local residents. If these disamenities are not captured in the hedonic then the 
specification error may result in a reduced level of estimated capitalisation. 
 
A third explanation arises due to the potential for greater uncertainty with respect to future school 
quality in rapidly growing areas. This uncertainty arises from two sources. First, school quality is 
sensitive to both the quantity and quality of student intake. Both of these may exhibit greater 
variance in peripheral areas of new construction. Therefore, house buyers may be uncertain as to 
the exact quality of schools that will be available to them. They would then discount the amount 
they are willing to pay for current school quality to reflect this risk. Second, the designation of 
school catchment areas in neighbourhoods in which new construction is concentrated is likely to 
  24be subject to greater and more frequent change as LEAs try to equalise school intakes. This would 
add an additional source of uncertainty both as to school quality and the distance to be travelled to 
school because there is less certainty about the school to which a given address in such peripheral 
areas will be assigned. 
 
Measuring the level of subjectively perceived risk is likely to be difficult. Information is available 
to house buyers from a variety of sources. If home buyers are acting rationally, that they would be 
influenced by the variability of the quality measures for the schools to which their children would 
be assigned, and one might expect such a factor to be relevant regardless of the source of potential 
variability in school quality. Models V and VI include the standard deviation of our school quality 
measures over the years 1996-2001 as an additional explanatory variable for all observations. This 
period covers the time from which data would have been directly available to house buyers, and 
extends somewhat later to capture the eventual playing out of factors that may have been common 
knowledge to market participants at the time the house prices were being negotiated. If variability 
is interpreted as implying a greater risk, current school quality measures will be discounted and we 
should expect a negative sign on the standard deviation. 
 
There is a further factor that one might expect to influence the capitalisation of school quality into 
house prices. In any area there may be some houses whose structural characteristics or location 
make them less suitable for families with children. Such structures will tend to be purchased by 
households with no children and little willingness-to-pay for local school quality. It would not be 
rational to pay a premium for good local schools if the dwelling is unable to accommodate 
children. 
 
Unfortunately, “suitability for children” is not an easily observed characteristic in most housing 
data, and our data for 1999/2000 does not contain matching demographic information on the 
household occupying the sampled houses. Instead, we have made use of a 1993 data set for the 
same housing market that does contain such data. Using these data it was possible to estimate the 
probability of there being children of school age present in a household as a function of the 
characteristics of the house: the relevant characteristics determining this probability were the 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, the type of house (whether is was semi-detached), the size of 
the plot on which it was built and the distance the house was from the city centre. A logit model 
for the presence of school age children was estimated using these data and the parameters were 
  25used to generate estimates of the probability of children being present in each house in our 
1999/2000 sample (thus indicating its suitability for children).
14 
 
Both Models V and VI also contain a variable for the ethnic mix of the neighbourhood
15 and for 
peripheral areas of new construction. In Model V in Table 3, this has the form: 
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where all variables are as defined above, and in addition: 
βP  =  parameter to capture the differential impact of educational quality at the periphery 
π  =  estimated probability that there are school-age children living in the house 
δ  =  dichotomous variable taking the value 1 for houses located in peripheral areas of new 
construction, and 0 otherwise 
 
Note that the set E of indices of variables measuring educational quality now includes measures of 
the standard deviation in test scores. Model VI simply uses the dichotomous variable δ as a 
separate characteristic so it acts as a shift dummy for houses located in peripheral growth areas. 
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This allows us to test whether any discount strictly relates to school quality or just reflects 
unmeasured negative effects (disamenities) in such areas.  
 
The results reported in Table 3 are highly informative. All the school quality variables are 
correctly signed and significant at at least the 10% level. There is strong evidence of current 
school quality being discounted for risk as measured by the standard deviation of the quality 
                                                 








where . Appendix Table 2 reports details of the 
estimation of this relationship. 
-2.05+0.656 bedrooms-0.846 baths+0.772 semi+0.00076area+0.00077.distance e χ
⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
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15 This is measured as the percentage of the census ward population which was of Afro-Caribbean descent in 1991. It 
is not significant but it does not adversely affect the estimated parameters for other variables. It is discussed in the 
Introduction to this Feature. measures for each school over five years; and the capitalised value associated with a given level of 
school quality rises in proportion to the suitability of the structure for accommodating children. At 
the same time the value attached to the features of a house that make it more suitable for children – 
notably bedrooms – tends to be reduced. More bedrooms are mainly valued because they are 
useful for accommodating children in locations which will get them into better schools.  
 
Estimates of Model V show that there is indeed a strong discounting of school quality in wards 
where new construction was concentrated. Since this model outperforms Model VI in which the 
shift dummy for peripheral new construction areas is not significant, we can safely conclude that 
the discounting relates strictly to school quality rather than to the areas’ amenity levels. The 
estimated co-efficient for βPeriphery, indicates that for houses located in the peripheral areas of new 
construction the value of educational quality is discounted by more than 40% relative to houses in 
other parts of the city. This is a substantial discount, especially given the fact that the systematic 
risk associated with variability of school quality is separately accounted for by the inclusion of its 
standard deviation. Given our scepticism as to the likelihood that purely local elasticity of supply 
of housing could be the explanation (because it would imply a given level of school quality had a 
lower price in areas of new construction than it had elsewhere in the same housing market) it 
seems most plausible to attribute this to concentrated new construction imposing a further risk on 
local inhabitants: catchment area boundaries in such areas become more subject to revision leading 
to an additional source of uncertainty for local residents as to which school their children will be 
assigned and so to the relevant measures of current school quality.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have sought to show that while average measures of the price of school quality 
estimated over many communities may be useful, because of variation in the characteristics of the 
supply of school quality, one should expect that there would be substantial variation in the 
capitalised value of school quality between and even within cities. In addition we have highlighted 
what we see as the need to have as completely specified an hedonic model as possible if one is to 
obtain accurate measures of the capitalised value of school quality.  
 
Applying such an approach to the city of Reading in South East England for data relating to 
1999/2000 we find that the quality of both local secondary and primary schools was capitalised 
into house prices. The statistical significance of secondary schools was considerably greater as was 
the relative price that secondary school quality commanded. However there are far more primary 
schools and the range in their performance is considerably greater. Thus there was a larger total 
  27impact on house prices associated with ‘moving’ a standard house from the worst to best primary 
school catchment area than there was in the case of a similar move between secondary school 
catchment areas. The price paid for school quality was substantial and, in the case of secondary 
schools for which a direct comparison is possible, comparable to estimates for both 1984 and 1993 
in the same housing market. 
 
Four further conclusions emerged. The first was the need to include (at least in markets where 
school catchment areas are non-porous) the quality for the actual school to which a house is 
assigned rather than the quality associated with the nearest school. Indeed there was only a low 
correlation between the quality measures for the two. The second is the danger of obtaining an 
upwardly biased measure of primary school quality if as full a range of local neighbourhood 
characteristics and amenities as possible is not included. Simply omitting the employment 
deprivation index for the local ward from the model increased the absolute value of the parameter 
estimate for primary school quality sevenfold (while reducing that of secondary schools).  
 
The third conclusion is that there is evidence strongly suggesting that it is not so much measures of 
current school quality which are capitalised but of expected school quality. There is a significant 
discount associated with past variability of school quality. School quality also appears to be 
significantly and additionally discounted in areas in which new construction is concentrated. 
While this finding is consistent with the hypotheses of Hilber and Mayer (2002) and Brasington 
(2002) that the elasticity of supply of housing will influence the extent to which school quality is 
reflected in house prices, both our findings and theirs are capable of other explanations. In our 
judgement the most plausible interpretation – certainly for our observed within city rather than 
between cities discount - is that the it reflects uncertainty as to future changes in school catchment 
areas in such neighbourhoods and so uncertainty as to what school an address will in future be 
assigned. We regard this as the most plausible explanation both because of the unlikelihood that 
one could ‘buy’ a given school quality more cheaply in some neighbourhoods than others within 
the same housing market and because we do find strong evidence that there is a price discount for 
uncertainty. The additional uncertainty associated with re-drawing catchment areas (which 
increases the uncertainty as to which school an address will be assigned) is not directly included 
but is likely to be concentrated in peripheral areas of new construction. Our results do show, 
however, that it is unlikely that the discount in such areas reflects the influence of omitted local 
disamenities from the model since it attaches strictly to school quality rather than to the area itself.  
 
Finally our results also provide strong evidence that the capitalised value of a given level of school 
quality is a positive function of how good a family nest a particular house provides. School quality 
  28commands a higher price in houses better adapted for children. This is not a surprising finding but, 
unlike in theoretical work, in applied economics it is particularly gratifying to find evidence of the 
predicted but difficult to measure! 
 
In more general terms the results reported here confirm findings that access to better schools, 
whether provided free from taxation or through the market, is still conditioned on income. Schools 
may be ‘free’ but poorer households still face an income constraint on access to quality education, 
except that it operates through the market in housing rather than through the payment of school 
fees. 
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Price  1.000 0.138  0.182  0.202 0.215  0.089 0.142 -0.079  -0.146 
GCSE Assigned Secondary  1.000 0.435  0.450  0.409  0.163 0.203 0.264  0.168 
GCSE Closest Secondary    1.000  0.412  0.475  0.065 0.017 0.031  0.120 
Keystage2 Assigned Primary    1.000  0.815  0.137 0.104 0.095  -0.067 
Keystage2 Closest Primary        1.000  0.104 0.071 -0.006  -0.109 
Distance Assigned Primary          1.000 0.518 0.435  -0.069 
Distance Closest Primary           1.000  0.285  -0.007 
Distance Assigned Secondary          1.000  0.544 




Appendix Table 2: Presence of School-Age Children 
 
Logit model for children in household
Variable Estimate  t-value 
Constant  -2.04553 -3.98
Bedrooms  0.65621 4.11
Baths  -0.84646 -2.65
Semi  0.77168 2.86
Square Meters  0.00076 1.85
Distance  0.00077 1.23
    
Observations 345 
% Correct  64.058 
LR Chi-square  48.3148 
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